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ABSTRACT: In this paper we study the hypothesis that the repeated
purchases in the tourism markets could be considered as a consequence
of asymmetrical information problems. We analyze this hypothesis with
the case study of the Island of Tenerife by the estimation of a count data
model. We obtain that the length of the stay and the information
obtained from previous visits and/or relatives and friends might increase
the return to a destination suggesting the presence of a reputation
mechanism as proposed by Shapiro (1983). We also estimate the
determinants of the willingness to return confirming the main results.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we study some new factors explaining why tourists return to a
destination in the short-haul travel markets. In particular, we propose that these repeated
purchases could be considered as a consequence of asymmetrical information problems
in the tourism markets. We analyze this hypothesis with the case study of the Island of
Tenerife. This phenomenon is quite important in Tenerife, as the tourist repetition rate
for this island became 50% in 1999. Moreover, this island represents almost 20% of the
lodging offered in Europe during the winter season, which makes it one of the main
destinations in the sun-and-beach tourism market (Ledesma et al., 2001).
The intangibility of tourism services could be generating the typical information
problems associated with experience goods. Moral hazard can be coming from the
asymmetrical information in favour of sellers; in this way, suppliers have incentives to a
fly-by-night strategy by cutting the quality in order to maximize their profits. Sunk costs
could serve as a signal of quality. In spite of this, we focus on reputation as a
mechanism assuring quality when repeated purchases are possible (Shapiro, 1983).
In tourism markets with a potential moral hazard, it is possible to investigate if
the repetition can be explained by way of variables related to a reputation model. If that
is the case, we will be able to say that reputation can overcome the problems caused by
moral hazard.
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In the next section, we analyze a reputation model providing variables which can
describe the observed repetition. The third section examines the case of Tenerife in
order to test how relevant reputation is to tourist repetition. In section 4 we analyze the
sensitivity of the results. The last section points out some concluding remarks.
2. A REPUTATION MODEL
In this section we describe a simplified version of a reputation model based on
Shapiro (1983)
1. We have two levels of quality in the tourism markets, q=0 (low
quality) and q=1 (high quality). The quality of the product is known by the monopolist
who supplies it but unknown to the consumers
2. In this way there exists asymmetrical
information in favour of suppliers. The average cost of the high quality product (c1) is
greater than for low quality one (c0). In this model, the consumer decides whether or not
to buy  a unit of the product, while the monopolist can vary price and quality in each
period by an infinite horizon.
The length τ  of each period reflects the lag between successive sales. If  “κ” is
the instantaneous interest rate,  1 − =
κτ e r  denotes the one-period interest rate.
Consumer preferences
Consumers are characterized for identical preferences:
(1)                                       otherwise                0
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where p denotes the price of the product and parameter φ represents the taste for quality.
Information structure
We consider three scenarios in which consumers form their expectations. In all
cases, we consider that tourism involves experience goods, as the more direct way to
know the product’s quality is by consumption. These cases provide a group of variables
that influence the presence of a reputation mechanism in the market.
First scenario: reputation is public information. When a consumer buys the product, the
aditional information is available directy to the population. However, reputation
formation involves a lag of size k periods, due to both, the reduced ability of consumers
to observe quality after purchase and the delay required for this information to be
available to other potential buyers. The adjustment equation is given by:
                                                
1 Klein and Leffler (1981) is the seminal work studying the repeat-purchase mechanism of contract
enforcement. More complex reputation models can be found in Tadelis (1999) and Mailath and
Samuelson (2001).
2 Hörner (2002) indicates the need of competition in order to get a discipline effect on firms in a more
complete framework. In this paper we consider a monopolist version for a reason of simplicity.3
(2)                    k t t q R − =
where  Rt denotes reputation (expected quality) in period t, and k indicates the
adjustment lag in reputation when a purchase has taken place.
Second scenario: there exists an average reputation due to the presence of individuals
with a faster degree of adjustment and consumers with a longer lag in detection of
quality. In this case, we are assuming that some tourists are less able to know and
assimilate the real attributes inmediately after the consumption
3. This reputation
mechanism is given by
4:
(3)                    ) 1 ( 1 − − − + = t k t t q q R α α
with  α being the proportion of consumers who have a slower process of quality
detection.
Third scenario: there exists two types of consumers, one type (a proportion 1-β) that are
informed due to previous experience or through relatives and friends
5, and another type
that has no such information, who believe that reputation is going to be unaltered
between periods (Keane, 1996). The expression involving the dynamics of this
reputation is:
(4)                    ) 1 ( 1 1 − − − + = t t t q R R β β
The reputation premium
The monopolist chooses the quality in each period in order to maximise the
present value of profits. In all scenarios, the reputation mechanism works as a discipline
tool only if the monopolist’s benefits from a strategy of supply quality q=1 are no less
than those from a milking strategy in which low quatity (q=0) is offered and the price p1
for the quality q=1 is obtained.
In the first scenario, in which  the reputation adjustment is modelled by equation
(2), the condition for monopolist not deviating from the production of high quality is
given by:
                                                
3 The lag in detection of quality is very common in durable goods (see Shapiro, 1983). In the case of
tourism services it could mean that either some tourists did not consume them in the past or tourists
visiting with a short stay need more time to process and assimilate the information about the attributes of
the services consumed.
4 Caserta and Russo (2001) follows a similar approach but making the lag in detection of quality and the
period of time between purchases coincide.
5 Stiglitz (1989) follows a similar approach but assumes that a fraction of consumers is not loyal to the
seller in each period. In this sense, he obtains that the less loyalty there is among consumers, the higher
the price must be to induce firms not to cheat.4
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where the term on the left side is the present value of  profits from the strategy of q=1
and the term on the right represents the present value of profits when a monopolist
cheats consumers by suplying q=0 during k periods. After some algebra, expression (5)
can be presented in an interesting way:
() [ ]() (6)                             1 1 0 1 1 1 c c r c p
k − − + ≥ −
where c1-c0 is the cost of establishing a reputation for quality q=1 and the complete term
on the right side represents the reputation premium, i.e. the margins required for the
monopolist to not cut quality. The premium of reputation is increasing in the consumer
lag in detection in quality k. Moreover, it is increasing in r, and so in the size of period
between purchases (i.e. a lower frequency of purchases). In this way, the reputation
mechanism works especially well if individuals obtain more complete information when
purchasing the products and if sales are very frequent.
The second scenario considers two types of tourists with different lag size in the
knowledge of the true quality. In this case, the reputation is a discipline tool if:
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where the first right hand term indicates the profits by deceiving individuals with higher
lags in detecting quality and the second one the profits associated with tourists that
adjust quickly to quality expectations. The expression indicating the required premium
for reputation is given by:
() ()
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where frequent sales (small τ  and thus r), a greater proportion of  individuals with
more information immediately due consumption, and consumers obtaining more
information by the consumption activity (shorter lag in detection of characteristics)
facilitate the investment in reputation.
In the third scenario, a proportion 1-β of the population is informed due to
previous visits to a destination or via relatives and friends, while it is assumed that
reputation is going to be unaltered between periods for rest of the population. Equation
(4) can be interpreted as an adaptive expectation mechanism in which 1-β measures the
adjustment of reputation towards the true value between time t-1 and time t. The
reputation works if:5



























where 1/1-β indicates the number of periods before reputation effects disappear. By
solving the partial sum of this geometric progression, we obtain:
() [ ]() (10)                             1 1 0 1
1 / 1
1 1 c c r c p − − + ≥ −
−β
Following Shapiro, for small values of the interest rate per period r, the last equation
can be expressed as:
() (11)                            
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where the required premium of reputation is decreasing as 1-β, i.e., the proportion of
population being informed through previous experience or via relatives and friends.
We can summarize the determinants of the reputation premium pointing out that
its size is decreasing with the proportion of population that has previously visited the
destination or is informed through the previous experience of relatives and friends, and
with the proportion of individuals with more information obtained immediately by
consumption. It is increasing with the consumer lag k in detection of quality and with
the period τ  between purchases.
In this way, in tourism markets the presence of reputation is facilitated if:
a)  there exists a high degree of repetition (small τ ). In this case tourists are better
informed and it can reduce the presence of milking strategies.
b)  a great part of tourists have a greater ability to detect the characteristics of the
destination (small α and k). This can be due to a longer stay in the destination or
to better information based on previous visits.
c)  a higher proportion of tourists are informed via previous experience or through
relatives and friends (small β)
3. EXPLAINING REPEATED VISITS
In this section we explore the presence of a reputation mechanism in tourism
markets. In particular, we look for some evidence in the case study of the Island of
Tenerife. Tenerife is one of the most important destinations for European sun and beach
tourism. A relevant characteristic of tourism in Tenerife is the high degree of repetition
of those who visit the island; 50.5% of Tenerife’s visitors have been there at least once
before. In the case of the U.K., 70.6% of the tourists are returning visitors.
3.1. Variables6
We have used the survey carried out continuously by Cabildo Insular de
Tenerife of the tourists visiting the island. In particular, we consider data corresponding
to the years from 1996 up to 1999. This survey is a questionnaire answered by tourists
in the airports just before they return to their countries and includes socio-economic
characteristics of the tourists, the organization of their trips, the origin of the previous
information about the destination, the number of previous visits, and their degree of
satisfaction
6.
The dependent variable is the number of visits to Tenerife from the past to the
moment the surveys is taken;  N yi ,..., 2 , 1 = , where N is the number of counts and
i=1,2,…,n is the number of people surveyed.
Let us now describe the explanatory variables and their expected influence on
the endogenous variable, i.e. the number of visits. With respect to number of previous
visits PVi (which varies between 0 and 100) and length of stay LSi (which goes from 0
to 75 in 1996, from 1 to 87 in 1997, from 2 to 90 in 1998, and 1 to 180 in 1999), we
expect a positive effect on the reputation mechanism. Individuals that have previously
visited destination and with a longer stay get more complete information about the
characteristics of services and so the required premium for reputation is reduced. In the
case of  PVi this reduction can occur via a greater frequency of sales (lesser τ  and
greater r in equations 6, 8, and 10) while in the case of LSi it can be due to a smaller lag
k in detecting characteristics or a greater proportion 1-α of individuals with more ability
to detect the characteristics of a destination (equations 6 and 8). The third variable more
directly related to the reputation model described above is a dummy RFi with value 1
for tourists informed via previous experience or via relatives and friends and zero
otherwise. A greater proportion 1-β of these individuals makes the mechanism works
better as can be seen in equation 11.
The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1. As can be observed, the average
value of the number of previous times that a tourist has visited Tenerife goes from 1.1 in
1997 to 2.8 in 1999. The average tourist has stayed around ten days and 20% of them
declares their willingness to return. From 50% to 71% have received the relevant
information about the destination through previous visits and/or relatives and friends.
Furthermore, from 35% to 45% of the visitors purchased only the flight and lodging at
their origin, and half of them belong to the group of the high income segment.
We consider two satisfaction indices as declared by tourists (from 1 to 10) that
recognize the nature of experience good of tourism, since under perfect information
tourists would assign the maximum value to them (indicating a full satisfaction of their
expectations). These satisfaction indices correspond to sun  Si and beach B i.
Furthermore, we construct a dummy variable FLi with value one for tourists purchasing
at their origin only flight and lodging and zero otherwise. In this sense we expect that
individuals who purchase more services than flight and lodging before the trip have less
information about the destination. In other words, tourists with a good knowledge of the
destination prefer to purchase the additional services at the destination.
                                                
6 The survey eliminates individuals with more than a hundred previous visits. Moreover, we does not
consider visitors with more than thirty previous visits with lodging other than private apartment, given
that the motive of the visit is very likely to be business rather leisure.7
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics.



































































































                           Note: The standard deviation is in parenthesis.
Finally, we introduce some variables capturing the influence of lodging type and
the income levels of  the consumers. TAi, PAi and Hi denote three dummy variables
with value one (and zero otherwise) for rental apartments,  private houses or
apartments, and hotels, respectively
7. Ii
h and Ii
m with value one (and zero otherwise)
indicate individuals that belong to high and medium income segment, respectively
8.
3.2. Count data regression
We have applied a truncated count data regression model in order to look for
some evidence of the presence of reputation. Using this count data model we analyse
the influence of the variables presented in Table 1 on the number of visits to the
destination.
                                                
7 Following Shapiro (1983) we expect a reputation premium to increase with the quality of goods. In this
sense we could expect a positive influence of  touristic apartments opposite  to hotels. The influence of
reputation is more difficult to characterize for high quality offerings.
8 The medium revenue segment is defined by an interval from 2 millions to 4 millions of pesetas and the
high revenue segment includes individuals with a revenue greater than 4 millions.8
This type of regression model can be employed when we want to represent the
number of events that occurs over a fixed time interval. In fact, they have become
popular in empirical studies of economic behaviour in various areas of economics
9.
The main focus in count data regression is the effect of covariates on the
frequency of an event, measured by non-negative and integer-value counts. In this
sense, the standard Gaussian linear regression model ignores the restricted support of
the dependent count. To estimate the parameters there are several models, one being the
standard Poisson maximum likelihood specification. The leading motivation for
considering parametric distributions other than the Poisson specification is that they
have the potential to accommodate features in the data that are inconsistent with the
Poisson assumption. There are some common departures from the standard Poisson
regression as the failure of the mean equals variance restriction, truncation and
censoring, the excess of zeros or zero inflation problem, multimodality, trends,
simultaneity and sample selection or the failure of the conditional independence
assumption [see Cameron and Trivedi (1998), p.97].
Since we have truncated counts we employ models for truncation. The models
allowing for truncation are required if observations for dependent and exogenous
variables in some range are totally lost and the distribution of observed counts is
restricted. Truncated count models are discrete counterparts of truncated and censored
models for continuous variables. The most common form of truncation in count models
is left-truncation at zero [see Gurmu (1991), Gurmu and Trivedi (1992), Cameron and
Trivedi (1998)].
Our truncated variable,  i y , is the number of trips to Tenerife from the past to the
present in surveys taken on tourism in Tenerife;  N yi ,..., 2 , 1 = , where N is the number
of counts. The model is represented as:
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where ui is an error term and  () . f  is a linear model including a constant term. The
variable  N yi ,..., 2 , 1 = , is an example of left-truncation or truncation from below at
zero. As in the untruncated count models, the most important restriction in this model is
the equality of the conditional mean and variance. This assumption is often violated in
empirical applications, however, which causes the model would to be misspecified.
When the conditional variance of the data exceeds the conditional mean overdispersion
is present. One common alternative to the Poisson model is to estimate the parameters
of the model using maximum likelihood of a Negative Binomial specification which is
often used when there is overdispersion in the data. The most commonly used
explanation for overdispersion is that unobserved heterogeneity is present (i.e.: omitted
variables in the mean function, measurement errors in explanatory variables or
structural parameters being random). In this sense, to deal with unobserved
                                                
9 For a complete survey of these models, see Cameron and Trivedi (1998). Many examples of the use of
count data models exist, with the most important one being its application to the fields of health
economics (modelling the visits to doctors) [Cameron and Trivedi (1986)], labour economics (workers’
absenteeism and labor mobility), financial economics (loan default) [Schwartz and Torous (1986)],
patent studies [Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984)]. See also Gurmu and Trivedi (1994).9
heterogeneity and overdispersion one may allow for random variation in the conditional
mean by introducing a multiplicative error term.
Our truncated counts are the special case of Poisson (P) and Negative Binomial
(NB2, in terms of Cameron and Trivedi, 1998) without zeros. Following Gurmu and
Trivedi (1992), let  () ( ) i i i i y H y Y P θ ; = ≤  denote the cumulative distribution function of
the discrete random variable with probability density function  () i i y h θ ;,  w h e n
() β θ i i x′ − = exp  where  i x′ is a row vector of exogenous variable values for each
individual and β  is a parameter vector. If realizations of Y less than a positive integer r
are omitted, the distribution is called left-truncated. We consider two left-truncated
distributions, one of them being the left-truncated Poisson (LTP), which is given by:
() ( ) ( ) [],... 1 , , ; 1 1 ; ; + = − − = ≥ s s y s H y h s y y f i i i i i i i θ θ θ
where  () i i y h θ ;  is the untruncated Poisson distribution. The second left-truncated
distribution is negative Binomial (LTNB2). This is given by:
() ( ) ( ) [] ,... 1 , , , ; 1 1 , ; , ; + = − − = ≥ s s y s H y h s y y f i i i i i i i γ θ γ θ γ θ
where  () γ θ , ; i i y h  is the negative Binomial.
Also, we consider that our problem is without zeros,  1 = s  because the number
of visits includes the present one. The maximum likelihood estimation of left-truncation
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0 , ln θ θ , where n is the
number of individuals and θ  is the vector of parameters. In the case of left truncation





i i i y y f L
1
0 , , ln , γ θ γ θ . These models are quite nonlinear and require
iterative procedures for estimating the parameters. We use the BFGS nonlinear
optimization procedure.
The mean and variance in the untruncated Poisson is  i θ , but in the NB2 it is  i θ
and 
2
i i γθ θ+ , respectively. When  0 = γ  there is equidispersion because the mean and
variance are equal. But, when  0 > γ  there is overdispersion. Tests for overdispersion
are tests of the variance-mean equality imposed by the Poisson against the alternative
that the variance exceeds the mean. The null hypothesis of equidispersion,  0 : 0 = γ H ,
is tested against the alternative hypothesis of overdispersion,  0 : > γ a H .
In the case of truncated Poisson and NB2, mean ( i µ ) and variance (
2
i σ ) are
quite different from the untruncated case, because it’s necessary include a correction
factor ( i δ ). For LTP, the mean and variance are   i i i δ θ µ+ = and  () s i i i i − − =µ δ θ σ
2 ,
and the correction factor is  () i i i s θ λ θ δ , 1 − = . For the LTNB2 the mean and variance
are  
* *
i i i δ θ µ+ = and  ( ) s i i i i i − − + =
* * 2 2 * µ δ γθ θ σ , and the correction factor is
() () ( ) γ θ λ θ γ θ δ , , 1 1
*
i i i i s s − − + = . With these results, the mean of the left-truncated10
random variable exceeds the corresponding mean of the untruncated variable, whereas
the variance of the truncated variable is smaller.
Overdispersion is present when  0 > γ , so 
2 2 *
i i σ σ> . Therefore, the LTNB2
model’s departures from the LTP model may be formulated in terms of testing the null
hypothesis of equidispersion ( 0 : 0 = γ H ) against the alternative hypothesis of
overdispersion is  0 : > γ a H . In the case of truncated Poisson models against the
alternative of truncated negative binomial distribution, Gurmu and Trivedi (1992)
consider overdispersion tests by using adjusted score tests for these models. Henceforth,
for data left-truncated at s, they adjusted LM test for LTP against LTNB1 and LTNB2.
Concretely, in the case of LTP against LTNB2 and following Cameron and Trivedi
(1998), this test is:
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αα I ˆ  is the scalar subcomponent for α  of the inverse of the information matrix
and  ( ) () () [] i i i i i y F y f s θ θ θ λ ˆ ; 1 ˆ ; ˆ ; 1 − = −  where  () . f  and  () . F  are the untruncated
Poisson density and cumulative distribution functions.
3.3. Results
The results for the count data approach are presented in Table 2
10. From the
results we find that the length of the stay could be increasing the return to a destination.
This result seems to indicate that a more informed tourist is more willingness to return,
suggesting the presence of a reputation mechanism.The number of visits is increasing
with the degree of satisfaction of consumers as it was to be expected. This repetition is
especially relevant in the case of tourists obtaining the information from previous visits
and/or relatives and friends, as in the reputation model associated to the third type of
expectations; for instance, the conditional mean of the dependent variable is 2.45
() () 8982 . 0 exp  times larger in 1998 when RFi variable takes the value of one rather than
zero.
Furthermore, there is a robust influence from the variable introduced for
individuals who purchases only flight and lodging at their origin. Again, there are
significant problems with the medium-income variable, but we observe a clear effect of
individuals belonging to the high-income segment. Finally, we confirm a positive
influence from private houses or apartments on the number of times, since it increases
the conditional mean of the dependent variable between 1.7 and 2.6 times. The use of
owned (rather than rented) lodging, or lodging owned by relatives and friends can be
interpretated as a clear indication of the presence of reputation, making individuals
decision’s be in favour of the destination in the long run. The model of Shapiro predicts
                                                
10 Logically, we ommitted PVi, as the endogenous variable is the number of visits (including the current
one). The introduction of PVi as an explanatory variable in the Poisson regression is not appropriate: its
coefficient tends to one due to the quasi-perfect correlation between the endogenous variable yi and the
explanatory variable PVi; the rest of coefficients, which corresponding to the rest of explanatory variables
would be zero. We have also used the LTNB2 model for estimation, but the algorithms used did not
converge, showing an abnormal exit from the iterations.11
a positive influence of quality on the size of reputation premium and so a greater
difficult for the reputation mechanism to work. This is consistent with our finding of a
negative effect of the Hi variable on repetition that could be interpretated as a reduction
in the conditional mean of the dependent variable.
                                 Table 2. Left-truncated Poisson (LTP) estimation in  1 < s  visits.
































































































p R 0.4372 0.4364 0.3253 0.4395
2
d R 0.2718 0.1986 0.2324 0.2608
Number of individuals 2908 3620 4835 2407
                                     Note: The t-Student for null hypothesis that parameter is zero is in parenthesis.
                        a: FLi includes breakfast for 1998.12
4. CONSISTENCY OF RESULTS
In this section we study the robustness of the results in relation to the season –in
winter, tourists have fewer sun-and-beach alternatives destinations-. The influence of
the explanatory variables could be modified due to the different degree of competition
which characterizes each season. Furthermore, we estimate the model for two specific
origins of tourists: the United Kingdom and Spain. They represent the greatest and the
smallest degree of repetition of the visitors, respectively. Finally, we modify the
dependent variable in order to know the determinants of the willingness to return using
a logit approach and so we study the sensitivity or the determinants obtained in the
previous section.
4.1. Seasons
The survey used in this paper permits the distinction between the summer and
the winter seasons. The former is the period going from April to September while the
latter goes from January to March and from October to December. In winter, the degree
of competition in the sun-and-beach tourism market is much less than in summer, due to
the lack of good alternatives for tourists in this segment of demand (as well as to their
repetition). We estimate the count data model described in section 3 for each season,
and the results are presented in Tables 3 and 4. LTNB2 regression appears for the winter
season of 1996 and 1999, because the null hypothesis of equidispersion is rejected.
Table 3. Left-truncated Poisson (LTP) estimation in  1 < s  visits.
All countries and summer season

































































































p R 0.6218 0.5175 0.2715 0.4684
2
d R 0.3180 0.2243 0.2001 0.2606
Number of individuals 1457 1867 2497 111113
                                 Note: The t-Student for null hypothesis that parameter is zero is in parenthesis.
Table 4. Left-truncated Poisson (LTP) and
Negative Binomial (LTNB2) estimation in  1 < s  visits.
All countries and winter season
1996



























































































p R 0.3564 0.4461 0.3961 0.4504
2
d R 0.2684 0.2156 0.2744 0.2817
Number of individuals 1451 1753 2338 1296
                                     Note: The t-Student for null hypothesis that parameter is zero is in parenthesis.
                        a:
 FLi includes breakfast for 1996.
          b: LTNB2 regression appears for 1996 and 1999, because  LM T  indicates a rejection of the
null hypothesis of equidispersion.
As can be observed, in both seasons LSi and RFi are significant, pointing to the
relevance of the length of the stay and the information obtained (and conveyed) from
previous visits. We confirm that individuals with high incomes who stay in private
houses or apartments, and who purchase a reduced number of services at their origin are
the most likely to return. The significant problems of the Si variable in winter seem to
indicate a less importance to the sun as the reason why they return during this season.
The similitude of the results suggests the estimates presented in the previous section are
not sensitive to the different degrees of competition in both seasons.
4.2. Countries
The two main origins of tourists visiting Tenerife are the United Kingdom and
mainland Spain. British visitors present the highest degree of repetition while Spanish
visitors practically never return. The results of the estimation of the determinants of14
repetition for these two countries are presented in Tables 5 and 6. LTNB2 regression
appears for the United Kingdom in 1996 and 1999, because the null hypothesis of
equidispersion is rejected.
Table 5. Left-truncated Poisson (LTP) and
Negative Binomial (LTNB2) estimation in  1 < s  visits.
United Kingdom for all seasons
1996












































































p R 0.3916 0.3274 0.1743 0.3851
2
d R 0.2244 0.0990 0.1297 0.1921
Number of individuals 1040 1027 1771 888
                                     Note: The t-Student for null hypothesis that parameter is zero is in parenthesis.
              a: LTNB2 regression appears for 1996 and 1999, because  LM T  indicates a rejection of the
null hypothesis of equidispersion.
In three of the four years of this study we confirm the results obtained for length of
the stay variable and the variable of the information through relatives and friends, which
seems to indicate that if reputation is present the mechanism does not differ between
countries. Although in the case of United Kingdom the income variables present
significant problems, in general we observe a greater degree of repetition for tourists
belonging to the high income segment. For its part, the secondary home phenomenon
11
is more frequent in the case of British visitors. The underlying explanation of why
repetition occurs does not seem to change when we consider the different origins.
                                                
11 For a discussion of the economic effects of second homes and time-sharing, see Navarro-Ibáñez and
Becerra-Domínguez (1995).15
Table 6. Left-truncated Poisson (LTP) estimation in  1 < s  visits.
Spain for all seasons





















































































p R 0.7020 0.1951 0.4410 0.2814
2
d R 0.3531 0.0730 0.2488 0.2274
Number of individuals 596 877 883 394
                                     Note: The t-Student for null hypothesis that parameter is zero is in parenthesis.
4.3. A Logit Estimation
In this subsection, we construct a binary variable WRi, that equals 1 when the
tourist states his willingness to return to Tenerife during his next holiday and zero
otherwise
12. Our objective is to study if the results obtained are modified when we
change the dependent variable from an ex-post to an ex-ante return variable. We have
estimated a binomial logit based on the following expression:
                            (12)               ;
1







i i i e
e
z WR P P ′
′
+
= ′ Φ = = =
where Pi is the probability for an individual to return in his next holiday,  i z′is a row
vector of explanatory variables, ω is a colum vector of unknown parameters, Φ(·) is the
standard cumulative normal distribution function (so that Φ(λ) is the probability that
normally distributed random variable with zero mean and unit variance does not exceed
λ), and  () i i P WR P − = = 1 0 . The parameters in (12) are estimated maximising the
logarithm of the likelihood function with respect to individual observations:
                                                
12 Note that we create this variable conditional to the questionnaire of the survey. We would have liked to
ask visitors about their total willingness to return and not only in the next holidays. In this sense, we may
very well undervaluing the real willingness to repeat the destination.16
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This alternative approach allows us to consider a new explanatory variable: the
number of previous visits PVi. It permits the study of the influence of this variable (as a
proxy of the period between purchases τ) something which underlies the three types of
expectations presented in section 2.
The results of the logit estimation for the four years are presented in Table 7. As
can be observed, the number of previous visits has a positive and significant parameter
with a value between 0.14 y 0.20. Similarly, although the estimated parameter is smaller
than the one for the previous visits, the length of the stay increases the probability of
return in all cases.
Table 7. Binomial logit estimation results
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                                     Note: The t-Student for null hypothesis that parameter is zero is in parenthesis.
                        a: FLi includes breakfast for 1998.
The parameters for the satisfaction indices are positive as it was to be expected.
Except for 1997, individuals obtaining information about a destination from previous
visits and/or relative and friends are more likely to return. We only obtain evidence in
favour of willingness to return of individuals who only purchase flight and lodging at
their origin, indicating better informed consumers in the last two years. For its part, the
income variables have significant problems and we cannot extract clear conclusions17
about them. Finally, the lodging type variables indicate that private houses or
apartments increase the probability of repetition, while hotels have the smallest
influence.
In this way, the consideration of a dependent variable which is constructed in
terms of willingness to return confirms that the relevant variables are the same ones
already suggested from the reputation models: number of previous visits, lenght of the
stay and the information obtained through previous experience and/or relatives and
friends.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we examined the hypothesis that the repeated purchases (visits to
Tenerife) can be considered as a consequence of asymmetrical information in the
tourism markets. Specifically, we focused on reputation as a mechanism assuring the
quality of the tourist services. Thus, we described a reputation model based on Shapiro
(1983), introducing three possible types of expectations to analyze the determinants of
the reputation premium. In particular, we studied the presence of a reputation
mechanism in the case of tourism in Tenerife.
To that end we use data of tourists who have visited Tenerife in the years 1996
to 1999. We estimated a count data model for the number of visits of tourists. We obtain
that the length of the stay might increase the return to a destination. This result seems to
indicate that a more informed tourist increases the repetition, suggesting the presence of
a reputation mechanism. Moreover, the number of visits is increasing with the degree of
satisfaction of consumers, as was expected. This repetition is especially relevant in the
case of tourists obtaining the information from previous visits and/or relatives and
friends, as in the reputation model. These results suggest the presence of reputation as a
factor explaining the return to the destination. Furthermore, they are not sensitive to the
different degree of competition that characterizes the seasons nor to the countries of
origin of the visitors.
We also estimated the determinants of the willingness to return through a logit
model. It permitted to verify the results obtained from the count data model now for an
ex-post variable. Moreover, we detected the relevance of the previous visits in order to
ease the work of the reputation mechanism.18
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